Mossawa Center | 26 October 2026
From the October 2000 Uprising to the 2026 Elections: Shifts in Arab Voting PatternsBetween Boycott and the Search for Political Influence

On the eve of the Knesset elections on 27 October 2026, Palestinian Arab society in Israel faces an electoral contest unlike previous ones. After a quarter-century of fluctuations in turnout and boycotts, and three years of war in Gaza, shrinking freedoms, and an escalating crisis of crime and violence, opinion polls reveal shifts in voters’ priorities and expected participation. Yet the central question remains: can parliamentary representation be translated into real influence over government policy?
The relationship between Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and the ballot box has not remained constant over recent decades. It has undergone profound shifts between widespread participation and protest boycotts, between voting for Zionist parties and rallying around Arab lists, and between demands for independent parliamentary representation and the search for influence over the formation and policies of governments.
The 27 October 2026 elections follow a series of events that reshaped the political and social landscape of Arab society: from the October 2000 uprising, through experiences of unity in 2015 and division in 2019 among Arab parties, to the war in Gaza after 7 October 2023, accompanied by investigations and prosecutions over political expression, tensions in workplaces and universities, and a worsening crisis of personal safety and organized crime.
Although recent polls suggest that Arab turnout may rise, understanding these projections requires revisiting electoral history, examining differences across regions and social groups, and assessing the relationship between the number of Arab parliamentary seats and the actual capacity to change government policies.
October 2000: The Beginning of a New Phase in the Relationship with Elections
The October 2000 uprising, during which 13 Arab citizens were killed by Israeli police gunfire, marked a turning point in Arab society’s relationship with state institutions, particularly the police, government, and security agencies. These events, and the subsequent absence of criminal accountability for those responsible for the killings, affected trust in institutions and attitudes toward political participation. The crisis of trust deepened especially with the “Zionist left” parties led by Ehud Barak.
In the 1999 Knesset elections, turnout among Arab voters was approximately 75.2%. But the direct prime-ministerial election of 2001 saw a widespread Arab boycott, reaching 82%, before participation in the 2003 Knesset elections fell to around 62%.
The decline continued in subsequent years: turnout was 56.3% in 2006 and 53.4% in 2009, before rising slightly to 56.5% in 2013.
Not everyone who refrains from voting should be regarded as a political boycotter. An organized boycott expresses an explicit protest position, whereas non-voting also encompasses distrust of parties, a sense that participation is futile, political indifference, and practical obstacles. Nevertheless, the prolonged decline in turnout after October 2000 points to a deeper crisis in the relationship between Arab society and Israel’s political establishment.
A Quarter-Century of Participation and Abstention

Election Arab turnout Non-participation
1999 75.2% 24.8%
2003 62.0% 38.0%
2006 56.3% 43.7%
2009 53.4% 46.6%
2013 56.5% 43.5%
2015 63.5% 36.5%
April 2019 49.2% 50.8%
September 2019 59.2% 40.8%
March 2020 64.8% 35.2%
March 2021 44.6% 55.4%
November 2022 53.2% 46.8%
These figures reveal sharp fluctuations in participation. Following a sustained decline during the first decade of the millennium, the 2015 elections saw a marked increase with the formation of the Joint List. Turnout then fell below half in April 2019, before rising again following the reunification of Arab parties in September 2019 and March 2020.
The 2021 elections recorded the lowest turnout in this series, with more than half of eligible voters abstaining. However, turnout rose again in 2022 despite the division of Arab parties into three separate lists.
These shifts suggest that Arab voting behavior is shaped by several interconnected factors: the configuration of party alliances, political events, trust in leadership, perceived opportunities for influence, and the nature of electoral competition.
Unity of Electoral Lists: Effects on Turnout and Voting Preferences

The establishment of the Joint List in 2015 was a major milestone in Arab electoral history. It brought together Hadash (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Balad (the National Democratic Assembly), Ta’al (the Arab Movement for Change), and Ra’am (the United Arab List) on a single slate, following the increase in the electoral threshold to 3.25%.
The Joint List won 13 seats in that election, as Arab turnout rose to 63.5%.
However, this unity did not remain stable. In April 2019, two Arab lists competed and turnout fell to 49.2%. After the Joint List was reconstituted, turnout increased to 59.2% in September 2019 and then to 64.8% in March 2020, when the Joint List won 15 seats.
In the 2021 elections, Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, split from the Joint List, and turnout fell to 44.6%. In 2022, Ra’am, Hadash–Ta’al, and Balad ran on three separate lists and turnout increased to 53.2%, although Balad did not cross the electoral threshold.
Mossawa Center research indicates that division affected not only participation but was also associated with a shift of some votes toward Zionist parties.
According to an analysis published by the Center ahead of the March 2021 elections, Zionist parties received 108,709 votes in Arab localities in April 2019, compared with 85,458 in September 2019 and 58,386 in March 2020.
Meanwhile, the combined votes for lists representing the Arab public increased from 337,108 in April 2019 to 399,968 in September 2019 and 464,118 in March 2020.
Thus, votes for Zionist parties declined by approximately 46% between April 2019 and March 2020, while the combined votes for Arab lists rose by approximately 38%.
These changes cannot, however, be attributed to list unity alone; they were also influenced by changes in political circumstances, election campaigns, and overall participation.
Opinion polls analyzed by the Mossawa Center in 2025–2026 point to a continuing relationship between the configuration of party alliances and projected turnout. In one study, projected turnout was 66% under a unified Joint List scenario, compared with 58.1% under a divided-list scenario, a difference of 7.9 percentage points.
One survey also showed projected voting for Zionist parties falling from 22% under a division scenario to 11.4% under a unity scenario.
An Analysis of Opinion Polls Published Over the Past Two Years.
These remain polling scenarios, not direct measurements of what will happen in the 2026 elections, in which two Arab lists are competing.

Declining Support for Zionist Parties: From a Majority to a Minority of Arab Votes
Electoral change is not limited to participation and abstention; it also encompasses voting preferences. In the 1992 elections, Zionist parties received 52.3% of Arab votes, with the Labor Party alone receiving 20.6%. Three decades later, the share of Zionist parties had fallen to approximately 14.2% in the 2022 elections.
This shift reflects changes in the relationship between Arab voters and Israeli parties and the rise of independent Arab political frameworks. It does not mean, however, that Arab voters form a homogeneous bloc or that voting for Zionist parties has disappeared.
At different times, Arab votes have gone to Labor, Meretz, Blue and White, Likud, and other parties, reflecting varying political, local, and social considerations.
A 2021 Mossawa Center analysis reported that Blue and White received 34,453 votes in Arab localities in April 2019 and 25,418 in March 2020. Likud received 12,568 votes in April 2019 and 9,355 in March 2020.
Voting for Zionist parties cannot be explained by a single factor. It may relate to historical party affiliation, political and economic positions, local relationships with candidates and parties, or expectations regarding government services and representation. It may also be affected by dissatisfaction with the performance or positions of Arab lists.
The available data do not allow the relative weight of each explanation to be determined precisely, nor do they justify generalizing a single voting pattern to an entire religious or social group.
Geography, Religion, Age, and Gender: A Diverse Electorate
The results of the 2022 elections reveal clear differences among the Galilee, the Triangle, the Naqab (Negev), and mixed cities.
In the Galilee and the north, Hadash–Ta’al was prominent, while the Triangle saw close competition among the three Arab lists. In the Naqab, Ra’am received approximately three-quarters of the votes in Arab Bedouin communities. In mixed cities, voting patterns differed between Haifa, Acre, and Nof HaGalil on the one hand, and Lod, Ramla, and Jaffa on the other.
These differences reflect overlapping historical, organizational, and social factors, as well as the presence of local candidates and relationships between parties and local authorities.
Turnout also differs between recognized Bedouin towns and unrecognized villages in the Naqab, where housing conditions, infrastructure, and access to polling stations affect the exercise of voting rights.
Recent polls also point to generational and gender gaps. The presentation based on 2025–2026 surveys shows that the 18–24 age group was the least inclined to participate in the measurements presented, and that the gap between men and women was approximately 18 percentage points.
These findings raise questions about young people’s relationship with political institutions and the extent to which they feel that parties respond to their priorities concerning education, employment, housing, and personal safety.
Religious differences require more cautious analysis. Muslim, Christian, or Druze affiliation does not by itself determine electoral behavior, and turnout rates for each religious group cannot be derived from results in religiously mixed localities without additional data.
This is particularly important amid shifts in identity. In an April 2026 measurement included in the accompanying presentation, 33.6% chose Arab identity as their primary identification, 28% Israeli citizenship, 24.8% religious affiliation, and 13.6% Palestinian identity. These figures reflect responses to a question about primary identity; they do not imply that respondents lack other identities.
After 7 October 2023: The War in Gaza and a Reshaped Relationship with the State
The 2026 elections differ from earlier elections because they take place after three years of war in Gaza and the changes it has brought to Israeli society generally and to the position of Palestinian Arab citizens in particular.
The war that began on 7 October 2023, and the extensive killing and destruction that followed in the Gaza Strip, deeply affected Arab society, which found itself confronting a complex reality combining Israeli citizenship, Palestinian national identity, and humanitarian and social ties with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
The repercussions of the war extended beyond political positions to freedom of expression, employment, higher education, and relationships within shared institutions.
Human rights organizations, including the Mossawa Center, documented investigations, arrests, disciplinary proceedings, and dismissals from work or education related to posts and positions concerning the war. These measures also raised concerns about expanding restrictions on political expression, particularly among Arab citizens.
This was accompanied by an increase in hostile political and media rhetoric toward Arab citizens, as well as incidents of assault, threats, and tensions in public spaces.
From a human rights perspective, these developments concern not only individual freedom of expression but also the conditions for political participation itself. Citizens who fear being investigated or prosecuted for their opinions may become less willing to participate in public debate or political activity.
The effects of these conditions on electoral behavior are not settled. They may deepen distrust of institutions and encourage abstention, while prompting other groups to regard participation as a means of influencing policies that affect their lives and rights.
For this reason, if the higher turnout projected by 2026 polls materializes, it cannot automatically be interpreted as renewed confidence in Israeli institutions or Arab parties. It may also reflect a growing sense of the need for political protection under conditions of uncertainty.
Crime and Violence: The Issue at the Top of Voters’ Priorities

Alongside the war in Gaza and its repercussions, organized crime and violence have become among the most pressing concerns in Arab society.
Opinion polls over the past two years reveal the prominence of this issue. In measurements included in the accompanying presentation, 66.5% placed crime and violence at the top of their priorities in December 2024, 74.3% in November 2025, and 71.5% in April 2026.
A September 2026 poll published by the Israel Democracy Institute likewise confirmed that crime in Arab society topped electoral considerations among Arab respondents, while 32% said the events of 7 October were a central factor in determining their electoral choice.
The prominence of crime and violence does not mean that the war and the Palestinian question have become less important. Poll results depend on the questions and options presented, and the accompanying presentation shows that including a ceasefire among the choices increases its prominence as a priority.
These findings reveal overlapping national, civic, and social priorities rather than a sharp division between them.
Personal safety, freedom of expression, equality, the war, and economic policies all shape Arab citizens’ assessments of government performance and the role of political parties in influencing it.
The 2026 Elections: Polls Point to Higher Turnout and Changes in Representation
Recent opinion polls indicate growing interest in electoral participation in Arab society, although estimates vary among research institutions.
According to the latest estimates by researcher Yousef Makladeh, director of the Statnet Institute, projected Arab turnout ranges from 68% to 69%, compared with approximately 53.2% in the 2022 elections. Compared with the 2022 result, Makladeh’s estimates are approximately 15–16 percentage points higher. This is a comparison between a polling estimate and a previous election result, not a measure of an increase that has actually occurred.
Makladeh’s estimates also suggest that approximately 85% of Arab votes may go to Arab lists, compared with approximately 15% for other, Zionist parties.
A Channel 13 poll published on 23 October, to which Statnet contributed, gave the Joint List nine seats and Ra’am seven, for a combined total of 16 seats.
These projections concern an election contested by two Arab lists: the Joint List, comprising Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al, and the United Arab List (Ra’am), led by Mansour Abbas.
Yet the prospect of increased representation does not resolve disagreements over how parliamentary strength should be used.
The Joint List raises the possibility of providing conditional parliamentary support for an alternative government from outside the coalition, while Ra’am advocates direct participation in a governing coalition, drawing on its experience in the 2021–2022 government.
This difference reflects a debate about representation and influence: can Arab parties advance their communities’ demands through direct participation in government, or through conditional parliamentary support from outside it?
Polls conducted in 2025–2026 show varied attitudes among Arab respondents toward participation in government. According to averages in the accompanying presentation, 46.1% supported joining a governing coalition without conditions, 31.9% supported conditional participation, 12.1% favored outside support, and 9.9% rejected these options.
These findings underline the importance of distinguishing a desire to influence policies from support for joining any particular government.
Political Partnership and the Limits of Its Acceptance

One of the most striking contrasts revealed by opinion polls is the broad willingness within Arab society to pursue Arab–Jewish political partnership, alongside skepticism about the extent of its acceptance among the Jewish public.
According to the accompanying presentation, 64% of Arab respondents expressed strong or moderate belief in Arab–Jewish political partnership. Yet only 5% believed that such a partnership enjoyed strong support among the Jewish public.
This gap reflects a central dilemma of Arab political representation: the potential for influence depends not only on the number of seats won by Arab parties but also on the positions of Jewish parties and their willingness to negotiate with Arab parties or rely on their support.
In this context, the question of the legitimacy of Arab citizens’ participation in decision-making becomes part of the broader debate about political equality, rather than merely a matter of coalition arithmetic.
From Seats to Policies: How Should Political Influence Be Measured?
Past decades have seen different models of Arab parliamentary influence, through opposition, external support for governments, or direct coalition participation.
These experiences cannot, however, be assessed solely by the number of seats or political agreements.
Since 2000, government plans have been adopted to reduce economic and social disparities in Arab society, including Government Resolutions 922 and 550. Multiple actors helped advance these plans, including the Mossawa Center, Arab parties, heads of local authorities, human rights and civil society organizations, and government bodies.
Nevertheless, implementation monitoring reveals gaps between planned budgets and the amounts that actually reached projects and services.
According to the Mossawa Center’s monitoring of Resolution 550, which was planned at approximately NIS 30 billion over five years, the Center recorded expenditure of around NIS 5.3 billion through the end of 2025. This figure does not constitute a final assessment of the plan’s full duration, but it raises important questions about implementation, administrative obstacles, budget cuts, and transfers of funds.
These gaps are evident in education, housing, infrastructure, industrial zones, and social services.
Organized crime is another test of government policy’s ability to respond to Arab citizens’ needs. Government announcements and crime-fighting plans are insufficient measures of success on their own; assessment must also consider investigations into murders, the dismantling of criminal organizations, the protection of residents, and the restoration of trust in law-enforcement institutions.
The relationship between electoral participation and political influence therefore involves several stages: obtaining parliamentary representation, influencing government decisions, and then ensuring their implementation and shaping legislation.
Discrimination in Legislation: Since its establishment, the Knesset has enacted dozens of laws that discriminate against Arab society in Israel. The Knesset has seen a serious escalation in legislation that deepens discrimination and suppresses Arab society’s political freedoms, including the Jewish Nation-State Law, the Planning and Building Law, the Citizenship Law, and the Counter-Terrorism Law.
No political experience can be assessed without examining its capacity to influence the peace process, political and legal rights, government policies, and legislation that protects the rights of Arab society.
Concerns on the Eve of the Elections: Protecting the Freedom to Vote
Alongside expectations of higher turnout, concerns have emerged about the atmosphere at polling stations in Arab localities.
Reports of a plan by Likud and Religious Zionism to deploy approximately 2,000 activists at polling stations in Arab communities, ostensibly to monitor electoral integrity, prompted criticism and concerns about possible provocations or confrontations that could affect voters’ sense of safety.
These concerns do not mean that intimidation will necessarily occur, and lawful election observation is a legitimate right under the applicable rules. Nevertheless, distinguishing lawful observation from intimidation or interference with free voting remains essential.
Election authorities and the police are responsible for ensuring that citizens can reach polling stations without threats or harassment, protecting ballot secrecy, and preventing any attempt to disrupt the electoral process.
This responsibility is especially important given the political tensions Arab society has experienced in recent years and the sensitive relationship between Arab citizens and law-enforcement agencies. The High Court of Justice also rejected a petition challenging the carrying of weapons by political-party representatives into polling stations.
Can Participation Be Translated into the Power to Bring About Change?
More than a quarter-century after the October 2000 uprising, the relationship between Arab society and the ballot box cannot be reduced to a single trajectory of decline or growth.
Turnout has experienced sharp falls and successive increases, influenced by party unity and division, political events, trust in leadership, and expectations about the possibility of exerting influence.
At the same time, voting preferences have undergone a long-term shift from broad support for Zionist parties toward a majority of participating voters choosing Arab lists, while important geographic, social, and political differences persist.
The 2026 elections take place in a more complex context, following the war in Gaza and its impact on civil liberties and Arab–Jewish relations, amid an escalating crisis of crime and violence and persistent economic and social disparities.
Polls suggest that turnout may increase, but they do not establish the reasons for any such increase. It may reflect a desire to change policies, a search for stronger representation, fear that current conditions will continue, or a combination of these factors.
Nor does higher turnout necessarily mean restored trust in parties or government institutions. Citizens may vote despite disappointment with the political system because they see voting as one of the available means to express their views or influence decisions affecting their lives.
The most important question in the 27 October elections, therefore, is not simply how many Arab citizens go to the polls or how many seats Arab lists win.
It is whether that representation will translate into real influence over government policies, stronger protection of rights and freedoms, and tangible equality in the distribution of resources, services, and personal security.
Election results will reveal the level of participation and the direction of voting, but they alone will not resolve the crisis in the relationship between Arab citizens and political institutions.
A deeper answer will emerge in the years that follow, through the capacity of the government, Knesset, and public institutions to respond to Arab society’s demands and the contribution of political representation to changing policies that shape its life and future.
Prospects for Including Parties Representing the Arab Public in the Next Governing Coalition:
Most opposition and coalition parties state that they will not agree to invite parties representing the Arab public into a governing coalition. Polling data indicate that neither bloc has the majority required to form a government without parties representing the Arab public. Under such circumstances, a minority government would be formed with the support of one or more of these parties.